Hell hath no fury like a bureaucrat enraged.
On March 14, John Morton, the director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), admitted to Congress that, for three weeks in February, his agency had released 2,228 illegal aliens from immigration jails.
Previously, the Obama administration had claimed that only “a few hundred immigrants” had been released.
The alleged reason: Automatic budget cuts required by the Congressionally-imposed sequestration.
“We were trying to live within the budget that Congress had provided us,” Morton told lawmakers. “This was not a White House call. I take full responsibility.”
Morton and other agency officials spoke during a hearing by the House subcommittee on Homeland Security.
ICE officials had previously claimed that illegal aliens were routinely released. But Rep. John Carter, R-Texas, the subcommittee’s chairman, didn’t buy this.
Carter pressed Morton about the claim. And Morton admitted that the release of more than 2,000 illegal aliens was not routine.
Carter was rightly angered–more aliens were released in Texas than in any other state.
But, in hindsight, he shouldn’t be surprised. This is usually how bureaucracies react when forced to carry out decisions they dislike.
Consider two such incidents during the Presidency of John F. Kennedy.
John F. Kennedy
In April, 1962, U.S. Steel raised its prices by $6 a ton, and other American steel companies quickly followed suit.
Convinced that the price-raise would be inflationary, Kennedy demanded that the steel companies rescind it. When the companies refused, JFK was furious: “My father always told me all businessmen were sonsofbitches, but I never belileved him till now.”
Then he turned to his brother, Robert, then the Attorney General. And RFK, in turn, turned to J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the FBI.
RFK had run the Justice Department since January, 1961. Hoover had run the FBI since 1924.
And by now, he and Hoover detested each other.
J. Edgar Hoover and Robert F. Kennedy
Kennedy had been pressing the FBI to greatly expand its efforts against organized crime and violators of civil rights laws.
Hoover had long maintained there was no nationwide Mafia, only a loose assembly of hoodlums whose crimes did not fall under federal jurisdiction.
And Hoover–a staunch segregationist–wanted nothing to do with enforcing civil rights laws.
There were also differences in style between the two men which highlighted their mutual animosity. RFK was 36 in 1962; Hoover was 67. RFK was accustomed to showing up for work in his shirt sleeves; Hoover was always attired in a business suit.
RFK didn’t hesitate to pop into offices–including those of FBI agents–and start asking questions about cases he cared about. Hoover demanded adherence to a rigid chain-of-command, with himself at its top.
RFK bellieved that the steel companies had illegally colluded to fix prices. He told Hoover he wanted a full field investigation opened immediately into the steel companies.
As RFK put it: We’re going for broke…their expense accounts, where they’ve been a|nd what they’ve been doing…the FBI is to interview them all …we can’t lose this.”
He ordered the collection of evidence–both personal and professional–from the homes and offices of steel executives.
Hoover saw an opportunity to embarrass RFK while supposedly carrying out orders: He ordered FBI agents to visit the homes of steel executives in the middle of the night. Even reporters covering the crisis got late-night calls from the Bureau.
On April 13, beginning with Inland Steel, all of the steel companies informed the White House of their decision to refrain from price increases.
But the President’s victory soon turned sour. The press assailed the “Gestapo” tactics he had used against the steel companies. A cartoon that appeared in the New York Herald Tribune summed it up.
In it, Kennedy’s press secretary, Pierre Salinger, tells the President: “Khrushchev said he liked your style in the steel crisis.” JFK was so outraged that he canceled the White House subscription to the Tribune.
The FBI scored another victory at the Kennedys’ expense through Robert’s pursuit of organized crime.
RFK wanted the FBI to share its vast treasury of intelligence with other Federal law enforcement agencies charged with pursuing the Mob. But Hoover refused, claiming the FBI’s files were too sensitive to entrust to other agencies. And he threatened to resign if pushed too far on this.
This deprived Federal organized crime “strike forces” of essential intelligence.
Hoover, desperate to make up for lost time in pursuing organizeed crime investigations, called on the same tactics he had used against the Communist Party.
He ordered his agents to secretly install wiretaps and electronic bugs in mob hangouts across the country. This allowed the FBI to quickly learn who was who and doing what in the otherwise impenetrable world of the Mafia.
But in 1965, word leaked out that the FBI had bugged numerous casinos in Las Vegas. The Bureau faced serious embarrassment.
Hoover, the master bureaucrat, blamed RFK. He claimed that the Attorney General (who had retired from office in 1964 and become the junior Senator from New York) had authorized him to install bugs and wiretaps.
RFK–who was trying to remake himself as a liberal politician–was hugely embarrassed.
The antagonism between Kennedy and Hoover lasted until the day Kennedy died–on June 6, 1968, after being shot while running for President.




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THE AGENCIES WE DESERVE
In Bureaucracy, Law Enforcement, Politics, Social commentary on March 22, 2013 at 12:13 amThe quickest way of opening the eyes of the people is to find the means of making them descend to particulars, seeing that to look at things only in a general way deceives them.…
–-Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses
One morning at about 8:10, a friend of mine named Robert heard a helicopter repeatedly buzzing the San Francisco Ternderloin area, where he lives.
Thinking that a fire or police action might be in the works, he called the non-emergency number of the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD): (415) 553-0123.
Police dispatcher
And he got a recorded message.
This told him–in English–what he already knew: He had reached the San Francisco Police Department.
Then it told him this again in Spanish. Then again in Cantonese. Then came a series of high-pitched squeals–presumably for those who are hard-of-hearing.
Then the line went dead, and another recorded voice told Robert: “If you’d like to make a call, please hang up and try again.”
At that point, Robert decided to waste no more time trying to learn if there was an emergency going on in his area. Or, to put it more accurately, he decided to waste no more time trying to learn this from the SFPD.
Instead, Robert turned on his TV and checked all the local news channels. When he didn’t see anyone reporting a raging fire or police sealing off an area, he decided there probably wasn’t anything to worry about.
But later on he decided to call the SFPD once again–to complain at a level he believed would attain results.
That level was the office of its chief, Greg Suhr.
Robert didn’t expect to reach the chief himself. But he didn’t have to: Reaching Suhr’s secretary should serve the same purpose.
The secretary he reached turned out to be a sworn officer of the agency. She patiently heard out Robert’s complaint. And she totally agreed with it.
She also agreed that this was a longstanding problem with the SFPD–citizens not being able to get through for help because of an ineffective communications system.
Finally, she agreed with Robert that the situation counted as a major PR disaster for her agency. People who become disgusted and/or disallusioned with a police department’s phone system aren’t likely to trust that agency with their cooperation–or their lives.
Then she had a surprise for Robert: Like him, she had at times been unable to reach a live dispatcher–even when calling 9-1-1.
She added that the police department did not handle its own dispatch work. This had been farmed out long ago to the San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (SFDEM).
She said that the SFPD didn’t have any control–or even influence–over SFDEM, which operated as an independent agency.
Robert suggested that it was definitely in the best interests of the SFPD for someone at its highest level to contact SFDEM and demand major reforms. Or to find another agency that would take its dispatcher responsibilities seriously.
The chief’s secretary said she would pass along Robert’s comments to the proper authority.
Will anything change? Not likely, barring a miracle.
There are few events more frightening and frustrating than having to call the police, fire department or paramedics during an emergency–and get a recorded message.
Whether intended or not, the message this sends the caller can only be: “Your call is simply not important to us–and neither are you. We’ll get to you when we feel like it.”
When people call the police or fire department, they’re usually frightened–for themselves or others. They know that, in a fire or crime or medical emergency, literally second counts.
It’s going to take the police or fire or paramedics several minutes to arrive–assuming they don’t get caught up in a traffic snarl.
And it’s going to take them even longer to arrive if it takes the caller several minutes to reach them with a request for help.
This is the sort of bread-and-butter issue that local authorities–who operate police and fire departments–should take most seriously.
Mayors and council members should not expect to be treated with respect when their constituents are treated so disrespectfully in a time of crisis.
And citizens aren’t stupid. They can easily tell lies from truths.
Lies such as: “We’d like to put in a new communications system, but we can’t afford it due to budget cuts.”
And truths such as: While San Francisco faced a $229 million deficit for the fiscal year, 2012, it nevertheless found untold monies to tap after the San Francisco Giants won the 2011-12 World Series, 4-0.
Monies to decorate various San Francisco buildings (such as the airport) with the orange-and-black colors of the Giants. Or with the Giants logo.
San Francisco Airport–decked out with San Francisco Giants colors
Monies to throw a day-long party for the victorious Giants on October 31–Halloween.
So, in the end, it all comes down to a matter of priority–for both citizens and their elected leaders. As Robert F. Kennedy once said: “Every nation gets the kind of government it deserves–and the kind of law enforcement it insists in.”
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