Within investigative agencies such as the FBI and CIA, there are divisions specializing in two types of Intelligence:

Tactical Intelligence: This concerns matters that are of immediate importance. Examples: Al Qaeda is planning to set off a bomb at a particular place, or a top Islamic terrorist is due to arrive at a particular plce on such-and-such date.

Strategic Intelligence: This concerns matters that are of long-term importance. Examples: How does Al Qaeda recruit new members?  How does it launder its money?

For too long, Intelligence agencies have followed the “buy and bust” example of local and Federal narcotics enforcement agencies. That is: They have gone for the quick arrest of smalltime criminals while ignoring the operating processes of criminal organizations.

To actively combat Islamic terrorism, the American Intelligence community must thoroughly understand the enemy it is facing. Thus, that community should create a corps of experts specializing in:

(1) Islamic religion (2) Islamic history (3) Islamic culture.

Granted, only timely tactical intelligence will reveal Al Qaeda’s latest plans for destruction.

But no matter how adept Islamic terrorists prove at concealing their momentary aims, they cannot conceal the insights and long-term objectives of the religion, history and culture which have scarred and molded them.

While accumulating such intelligence, one question above all others should be kept constantly in mind: “How can we turn this religion / history / culture into a weapon against the terrorists we face?”

To demonstrate how the American Intelligence community could effectively apply such intelligence:

Cultural Intelligence: A U.S. News & World Report story has noted that Palestinian suicide-bombers have been deterred by the Israelis’ use of police dogs.

For religious and cultural reasons, Muslims consider dogs defiled—and defiling—creatures. Islamic terrorists fear that blowing up themselves near a dog risks mingling their blood with that of the dead or wounded animal—thus forfeiting their opportunity to enter Paradise and claim those 72 willing virgins.

Historical Intelligence: The age-old ethnic conflicts between majority Sunni and minority Shiite Muslims are now on lethal display in Iraq. The FBI and CIA can successfully exploit these when recruiting informants or fomenting rivalries among terrorist groups.

These are similar to the animosities once existing between American Indian tribes, such as the Pawnee and Cheyenne. Veteran Army officers used these hatreds to recruit warriors of opposing Indian tribes to scout against warriors of their longtime enemies.

Religious Intelligence: Contrary to politically-correct pundits, it is not only social or economic inequalities which inspire Islamic terrorists, but the Koran itself. Within its pages are numerous exhortations to wage war on “kaffirs” or “unbelievers.”

Dying for Allah is not seen as a waste of life. In fact, the Koran encourages it. Muhammad commands in Surah [chapter] 4:74: “To him who fighteth in the cause of Allah—whether he is slain or gets victory—soon shall we give him a reward of great (value).”

The American Intelligence community must become as intimately familiar with the mindset of its Islamic enemies as the best frontier Army officers became with the mindset of the Indians they fought.

General George A. Custer once freed several white female captives by threatening to hang the chiefs of the tribes responsible. The Indians scorned death by knife or gunshot.

But they feared that the spirit of a hanged man remained forever trapped within his body, thus preventing him from reaching the Happy Hunting Ground. And Custer, knowing this, put this intelligence to effective, life-saving use.

American Intelligence agencies must learn what our Islamic enemies most seek, most prize, and—above all—most hate and fear. Then these agencies must ruthlessly apply that knowledge in defense of America’s survival.

Ali Soufan was one of the few FBI agents intimately familiar with Arabic culture and language at the time of 9/11.  In his 2011 book, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda, he sums up the importance of “knowing your enemy.”

People ask what is the most important weapon we have against al-Qaeda, and I reply, “Knowledge.”

….As Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War, when we know our enemy’s strengths and weaknesses, and at the same time we know our capabilities–that’s when we are best-placed to achieve victory.

…Our greatest successes against al-Qaeda have come when we understood how they recruited, brainwashed and operated, and used our knowledge to outwit and defeat them. 

Our failures have come when we instead let ourselves be guided by ignorance, fear and brutality.

It’s long past time to re-think the role that inflexible bureaucracies have played–and continue to play–in the so-called “war on terror.”

In fact, a good place to start would be scrapping that phrase.

“Terrorism” is not and never has been an end in itself. It is, instead, a means to an end, nearly always used by organizations unable to field conventional armies.

“Terror,” as such, can never be eliminated. But those who practice it can be targeted for destruction.

Thus, a more accurate–if politically incorrect–title for the conflict now raging between the United States and its Islamic enemies would be: “The War on Islamic Aggression.”

It’s true that not all Islamics are terrorists. But it’s equally true that most of the terrorists now threatening America are Islamics.

Bureaucracies are, by their very nature, conservative institutions. They may start out as innovators, but, over time, techniques that were new and fresh become old and brittle.

What worked in the past against one problem fails to work when pitted against an entirely new challenge.

Since 1981, the United States has been on the defensive against Islamic terrorism. As noted investigative journalist Bob Woodward warned in a 2001 Frontline documentary:

“These terrorist incidents–they [American Intelligence agencies] used the tools that were available, but it was never in a coherent way.

“I know from talking to those people at the time, it was always, ‘Oh, we’ve got this crisis. We’re dealing with the Achille Lauro now,’ or ‘We’re dealing with Quaddafi,’ or ‘We’re dealing with Libyan hit squads,’ or ‘We’re dealing with Beirut.’

“And it never- they never got in a position where they said, ‘You know, this is a real serious threat,’ not just episodically, but it’s going to be a threat to this country throughout the administration, future administrations.

“We need to organize to fight it. It can’t be a back-bench operation for the FBI and the CIA. It’s got to be somebody’s issue, so it’s on their desk every day. What do we know? What’s being planned? What are the threats out there?”

It’s time for the United States to cast aside its hidebound, case-by-case approach to fighting Islamic aggression. It’s time for American Intelligence to recognize that the secrets to defeating Islamic terrorism lie within the history, culture and religion of the enemies we face.

In Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart, Saladin and the Third Crusade [Doubleday, 2001] James Reston, Jr. demonstrates that the past is truly prologue for the soldiers of Islam.

Suicide Warriors: Rashid al-Din Sinan, known as “The Old Man of the Mountain,” was the head of the Assassins. He was imam to a cadre of young men, known as fidai, who swore personal allegiance to him.

Once, to prove the devotion of his followers to a Crusader leader, Sinan gave a quick hand signal to two fidai high in a tower. At once, both leaped to their death in the ravine below. Sinan then asked the Crusader if he would like to see another such example of loyalty; the Frank said this wasn’t necessary, that he was convinced.

Promises of Paradise: “Assassins” is derived from “hashish.” During the fidai indoctrination ceremony, a devotee was given a potion laced with cannabis, put to sleep, and then transported to a beautiful garden.

When he awoke, he believed he was being given a glimpse of the Paradise to come. He would extend his hand and receive a dagger–and instructions for murder: “Go and slay so-and-so, and when you return, my angels will bear you into Paradise.”

Sunnis vs. Shiites: Sinan–from Basra–belonged to the Shi’ite (minority) branch of Islam. Even in the twelfth century, the rivalry between Shi’ism and Sunnism was intense. Sinan blamed Saladin for defeating and erasing the Shi’ite Fatamid Caliphate of Cairo and imposing Sunnism in its place. Sinan ordered two attempts on the life of Saladin himself.

The first failed when the assassins were intercepted and killed only a few feet from Saladin. The second almost succeeded: Posing as one of the Sultan’s bodyguards, the assailant slashed at Saladin’s head.

Bleeding and terrified, Saladin fought off his attacker until his guards intervened. Saladin survived only because he wore a mailed headdress beneath his turban.

Saladin quickly negotiated a non-aggression pact with Sinan

“The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend”: The Latin Christians were not Sinan’s greatest enemy. This honor was reserved for the Muslim viziers in Aleppo and Mosul. As a result, Sinan reached an accommodation with the Templers.

The Assassins and the military monks understood each other well, for they had much in common: Both groups were luxury-spurning religious fanatics.

On occasion, the two went to war: After a boundary dispute in 1154, the Assassins murdered Raymond II of Tripoli; in return, the Templers butchered a number of Muslims.

After that, an accommodation was reached. For a time, the Assassins paid the Templers a hefty tribute to be left alone.